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THE POTAWATOMIIOKLAHOMA GAMING COMPACT
OF 1992: HAVE TWO SOVEREIGNS ACHIEVED A
MEETING OF THE MINDS?
Michael W. Ridgeway*
Indian tribes have the exclusive right to regulate gaming activity
on Indian lands if the gaming activity is not specifically prohibit-
ed by Federal law and is conducted within a State which does
not, as a matter of criminal law and public policy, prohibit such
gaming activity.'
- from the Indian Gaming Regulatory Acte
L Introduction
With the passage of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) in 1988,
Congress provided the statutory framework for regulating gaming activities by
Indians on Indian land. The Act cleared up some of the confusion and
disagreement about the powers and duties of the various state and tribal
governments. However, the IGRA has spawned some new areas of uncertain-
ty. State-tribal relations are being tested, and settled issues of sovereignty may
be thrown to the wind.
This comment will first look at the IGRA in the abstract. Next, case law
interpreting key sections of the IGRA will be examined. This will be followed
by a reconstruction of the negotiation process which led to a gaming compact
signed by the State of Oklahoma and the Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian
Tribe of Oklahoma.3 The story of how these two sovereign governments
negotiated toward a meeting of the minds illustrates how the IGRA can work
in the real world.
The story of the Oklahoma-Potawatomi gaming compact also shows how
the IGRA does not work in the real world. In Oklahoma, and perhaps other
* Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. 25 U.S.C. § 2701(5) (1988).
2. Id. §§ 2701-2721.
3. Tribal-State Class III Gaming Compact, Aug. 27, 1992, Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian
Tribe of Oklahoma-State of Oklahoma (on file with the American Indian Law Review)
[hereinafter Potawatomi-Oklahoma Gaming Compact].
Gaming compacts are not published in hard copy, nor are they available in LEXIS or
Vestlaw. However, copies may be obtained from the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Office of Tribal
Services, 1849 C Street N.W., Washington, D.C. 20240. In Oklahoma, the documents may be
viewed and copies obtained from the Secretary of State, State Capitol Building, 2300 N. Lincoln,
Oklahoma City, Okla. 73105 (telephone (405) 521-3911).
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states, the Act may not be worth much more than the paper upon which it is
printed. Congress' express intent in passing the IGRA is being thwarted by
judicial decisions. Some of the problems with the IGRA will be analyzed and
suggestions made for how they should be resolved.
I. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
A. Purpose
Congress expressed three reasons for passage of the IGRA. First, the Act
provided a statutory basis for tribes to operate gaming activities.4 Congress
intended for gaming to be used as a tool to promote tribal economic
development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments.'
Second, the IGRA provided methods for regulating tribal gaming
activities.' This was necessary to ensure that the games would be conducted
and played fairly and to prevent infiltration by organized crime or other
corruption.7 Congress wanted to ensure that tribes received the benefits of
their activities!
Third, Congress wanted federal oversight to protect gaming as a means of
generating tribal revenue. It created the National Indian Gaming Commission9
to supervise tribal bingo operations and similar enterprises." The Commis-
sion also has limited power to veto tribal attempts to enter into other types of
gaming operations."
B. Scope of the IGRA
Congress divided gaming into three categories: class I, class II, and class
I. Class I includes social games played solely for prizes of minimal value.2
It also includes traditional Indian gaming that is related to tribal ceremonies
or celebrations. 3 Under the IGRA, class I gaming on Indian land is
exclusively controlled by the tribe and is exempt from federal or state
regulation.
Class II gaming includes bingo and its variations.'" It also includes games
such as pull-tabs, lotto, punch boards, and tip jars, if played in the same
4. 25 U.S.C. § 2702(l) (1988).
5. Id.
6. Id. § 2702(2).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. §§ 2704-2708.
10. id. §§ 2702(3), 2706, 2710.
11. Id. § 2710(d)(2)(B).
12. Id. § 2703(6). "Minimal value" is not defined in the statute or in subsequent decisions.
13. Id. § 2703(6).
14. id. § 2710(a)(1).




location as a tribal bingo operation. 6 Class II gaming also includes card
games if the state in which a tribe is located approves of such games by
statute." In addition, if the statutes are silent about card games, and the
games are played anywhere in the state, they are considered class 11."
To some extent, the definition of class II gaming can vary from state to
state, depending on local laws." However, the National Indian Gaming
Regulatory Commission has refined class H's definition somewhat. If the
activity involves gambling devices as defined by federal law," it cannot be
class II gaming.' Class II gaming is generally regulated by the tribe.'
Class III gaming is defined as "all forms of gaming that are not class I
gaming or class II gaming."' This includes the traditional forms of gam-
bling, such as casino games, pari-mutuel horse racing, and most electronic or
mechanical games of chance. Before a tribe can operate such a venture on
Indian land, it must reach an agreement with the state in which the land is
situated.' The agreement, or "tribal-state compact," governs such things as
regulation, operation, and taxation of -class III gaming activities. 6 The
interaction and agreement between the state and the tribe will be the focus of
this comment.
C. Tribal-State Gaming Compact: The Statutory Process
An Indian tribe does not need the state's permission to conduct class I or
class II gaming on Indian land." Conversely, a tribe generally cannot
conduct class M gaming without a tribal-state gaming compact.' The tribal-
state compact is "the centerpiece of the IGRA's regulation of class III
gaming."'29 The power of the states to resist such agreements is severely




19. The definition for class II gaining also includes a grandfather clause for specifically
enumerated activities that were in effect prior to May 1, 1988, in Michigan, North Dakota, South
Dakota, and Washington. Id. § 2703(7)(C). The act also recognizes the possibility of grand-
fathering other activities. Id. § 2703(7)(D), (E).
20. Id. § 2710(b).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 1171 (1988).
22. See 57 Fed. Reg. 12,382-84 (1992) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 502).
23. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b) (1988).
24. Id. § 2703(8).
25. Id. § 2710(d)(1)(C).
26. Id. § 2710(d)(3)(C).
27. Id. § 2710(a)(1), (b)(1).
28. Id. § 2710(d).
29. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut, 913 F.2d 1024, 1031 (2d Cir. 1990).
30. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7) (1988).
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wish to enter into a tribal-state gaming compact."
When a tribe decides it wants to begin a class I gaming operation, it
notifies the state that it wishes to enter into negotiations. The state is then
required to "negotiate with the Indian tribe in good faith to enter into such a
compact."32
If the state fails to respond to the tribe's request for negotiations," or if
it attempts to directly tax the tribe or Indian lands as part of a gaming
compact,' such action is evidence of bad faith. To encourage "good faith"
negotiations, the IGRA contains relatively tight time restrictions. The Act
allows a tribe to sue in federal court if an agreement has not been reached
within 180 days of the tribe's request' The IGRA makes it easy for a tribe
to make a prima facie case against a state. If the tribe shows that a compact
has not been entered into and introduces any evidence that the state has not
acted in good faith, the burden of proof shifts to the state.' The state is then
required to prove that it has made a good faith effort to negotiate the gaming
compact?'
The federal court can force the parties to the negotiating table and can
order them to reach an agreement within sixty days. 8 If a tribal-state
compact still has not been completed at the end of sixty days, the court can
appoint a mediator of its choice." The state and the tribe each submit their
final proposals to the mediator." The mediator chooses the proposed
compact that best reflects the goals of the IGRA.4' If the state agrees within
sixty days to the proposal chosen by the mediator, the court action is resolved
and the parties have a gaming compact.42 If the state does not agree with the
mediator's choice, the case goes to the Secretary of the Interior. At that point,
the Secretary "shall prescribe, in consultation with the Indian tribe, procedures
which are consistent with the proposed compact selected by the mediator."43
After a gaming compact has been agreed to by negotiators for the tribe and
the state, Oklahoma state law adds another step. As part of the state's
approval process, the compact must have the blessing of both the governor
and the state legislature's Joint Committee on State-Tribal Relations." After
31. d.
32. Id. § 2710(d)(3)(A).
33. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(ii).
34. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii).
35. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(i).
36. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(ii).
37. Id.
38. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii).
39. I. .§ 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv).
40. 1.1.
41. Id.
42. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vi).
43. .. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii).




receiving approval, the compact is filed with the Oklahoma Secretary of
State.4
In addition, the tribe must pass an ordinance or resolution authorizing the
gaming activities covered by the compact.' The ordinance may be passed
either before negotiations, concurrent with approval of the agreement, or any
other time during the process." The ordinance or resolution must be
approved by the Chairman of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Commission"'
and published in the Federal Register.49 If the Chairman does not act within
ninety days, the ordinance is considered to have been approved.'
Upon completion of the above steps, the approved compact is delivered to
the Secretary of the Interior. The agreement does not take effect until the
Secretary's approval has been published in the Federal Register.' The
Secretary may disapprove a gaming compact only if it violates a provision of
the IGRA, another federal law, or the federal government's trust obligations
to Indians." If the compact is not acted upon by the Secretary within forty-
five days, it is considered to have been approved by default. If the compact
is considered to have been approved by the Secretary's inaction, the Secretary
still must publish notice of approval in the Federal Register.'
D. Allowable Tribal Gaming Activities
Class I gaming is allowed if "located in a State that permits such gaming
for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity."55 Tribes may not
conduct gaming activities within a state which, "as a matter of criminal law
and public policy, prohibit[s] such gaming activity."56 States and tribes have
often disagreed on the meaning of these sentences. Does "such gaming
activity" refer to class III as a whole or to a specific game?
Relations is made up of ten state legislators. Five senators are appointed by the President Pro
Tempore, and five representatives are appointed by the Speaker of the House. The committee's
ongoing purpose is to oversee and approve all agreements between tribal governments and the
State of Oklahoma. Id. § 1222.
45. Id. § 1221(E).
46. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1), (2) (1988).
47. Id.
48. Id. § 2710(d)(1)(A)(iii), § 2710(d)(2), § 2710(e).
49. Id. § 2710(d)(2)(B).
50. Id. § 2710(e).
51. Id. § 2710(d)(3)(B).
52. Id. § 2710(d)(8)(B).
53. Id. § 2710(d)(8)(C).
54. Id. § 2710(d)(8)(D). If a compact is not acted on by the Secretary, the IGRA simply says
that the compact is approved and the Secretary shall publish notice of approval. The IGRA does
not specifically state when the Secretary must publish notice of approval. It is not clear whether
a compact can take effect without publication of approval.
55. Id. § 2710(d)(1)(B).
56. Id. § 2701(5).
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For example, if a state allows and regulates pari-mutuel horse racing, has
it waived its objection to any class III gaming that a tribe may want to
conduct? Is such a state required to negotiate with a tribe that wants to set up
a full-blown casino? Tribes have argued for an expansive interpretation,
which could allow them to operate games which may not be expressly legal
within the state. In the tribes' eyes, if a state permits some forms of gambling,
it cannot claim a criminal law and public policy that prohibits "such gaming
activity' as encompassed by class III's definition.
States argue that Congress intended to allow them to control the specific
types of class III gaming that would be allowable within the state's borders.
For example, if a state's statutes allow charitable organizations to conduct
lotteries, then perhaps a lottery conducted on Indian land should be subject to
the same state regulations and limitations.
The conflict arises because the IGRA is conspicuously vague. The Act
does not spell out what must be contained in a gaming compact. It does not
answer questions of sovereignty or jurisdiction. In fact, it specifically states
that such questions are open for negotiation. 7 In effect, everything is open
for negotiation - whether to apply state or tribal laws,58 how the costs of
regulation will be paid,59 who will enforce the law,' and so on. After the
parties have decided that gaming will be allowed, they can get as creative as
they wish. The body of federal Indian law does not necessarily apply, because
sovereign rights can be created or waived by agreement."'
If the parties are going to get hung up, it will most likely be at the
beginning of the negotiations. Conflicts arise regarding what games will be
allowed. The question hinges on the state's criminal law and public policy.'
Does the state regulate games of chance or prohibit games of chance?
Attempts to distinguish between civil-regulatory and criminal-prohibitory state
policy began even before passage of the IGRA. The foundation for answering
the regulatory-prohibitory question is the pre-IGRA case of California v.
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians.'
57. Id. § 2710(d)(3)(C).
58. Id. § 2710(d)(3)(C)(i).
59. Id. § 2710(d)(3)(C)(iii), (iv).
60. Id. § 2710(d)(3)(C)(ii).
61.' Id. § 2710(d)(3)(C). Pre-IGRA decisions and decisions involving class 1I gaming often
center on the applicability of the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1988). The ACA
allows federal prosecution of certain state law violations that occur on Indian land. Class Ill
gaming compacts can go beyond state law by allowing games on Indian land that are more tightly
regulated on state land. Because such games would be conducted pursuant to an agreement with
the state, an exception to state law is created. Therefore, it is unlikely that the ACA will often
apply to class III gaming.
62. 25 U.S.C. § 2701(5) (1988).




In Cabazon, the Indians operated bingo and card game operations on tribal
land. California law limited bingo to certain charitable organizations and
capped prizes at a maximum of $250 per game. The State of California
attempted to prohibit the tribal games or at least impose its statutory
limitations on the tribes. The United States Supreme Court held that tribes
may conduct gaming operations free of state regulation in states which
regulate, but do not prohibit, gaming.'
The Court discussed why California could not prohibit activities on Indian
land that were regulated on state land:
California does not prohibit all forms of gambling. California
itself operates a state lottery, and daily encourages its citizens to
participate in this state-run gambling. California also permits
parimutuel horse-race betting. Although certain enumerated
gambling games are prohibited . . . . games not enumerated,
including the card games played in the Cabazon card club, are
permissible. . . . In light of the fact that California permits a
substantial amount of gambling activity, including bingo, and
actually promotes gambling through its state lottery, we must
conclude that California regulates rather than prohibits gambling
in general and bingo in particular.
The Court also explained why a state could not impose its regulations on
tribal gaming activities. The federal government has a strong interest in
encouraging tribal economic development.' The interests of tribes parallel
that of the federal government, and bingo and other gaming provides a major
source of revenue for tribes.' State regulation of tribal gaming would
infringe upon a tribe's sovereign powers.
The Supreme Court's decision in Cabazon was handed down just six days
after the IGRA was introduced.' Congress made it clear that the reasoning
from Cabazon should apply to the IGRA. The Senate Report on the bill
specifically recognized Cabazon as defining the distinction between state laws
which prohibit an activity and laws which regulate permissible activities.70
Tribes sometimes want to operate gaming activities in a manner that
violates state law. In United States v. Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe,7' the
tribe sought a declaratory judgment that its blackjack operation was legal,
64. Id. at 221-22.
65. Id. at 210-11 (citations omitted).
66. Id. at 216-17.
67. Id. at 218-19.
68. Id. at 221-22.
69. Cabazon was decided on Feb. 25, 1987. The IGRA was introduced on Feb. 19, 1987.
70. S. REP. No. 446, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071,
3076.
71. 897 F.2d 358 (8th Cir. 1990).
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Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
522 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18
even though it accepted bets in excess of the maximum limit allowed under
South Dakota law. The Eighth Circuit held that a tribe's blackjack game does
not have to comply with the state's law regarding wager and pot limits.'
The court grandfathered the tribe's venture into class II, but its reasoning
regarding state law is relevant to class III as well. The court pointed out that
the IGRA's legislative history embraces the rationale of Cabazon 3 In order
to determine the effect of state law on the tribe's card games, the court
examined whether South Dakota's gaming laws were regulatory or prohibito-
ry. 4 Because South Dakota allowed bingo, horse and dog race betting,
certain card games, and other forms of gambling, the state's policy could not
be considered prohibitory." The court stated that the tribe had fulfilled the
IGRA's requirement that gaming be "located within a State that permits such
gaming for any purpose by any person, organization or entity ....
Because of the Cabazon rule, the State of South Dakota was not allowed to
extend i'ts betting limits to a regulated activity conducted on Indian land."
States may want to limit tribal-state gaming compacts to games which are
approved of by the state. In Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior
Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin,78 the State believed that certain games were
not proper subjects for a gaming compact. The State refused to negotiate, and
the Tribe sued for failure to bargain in good faith. The court ordered
Wisconsin to negotiate with the Tribe for the games in question,7
Again, the court followed Cabazon in reasoning that the "issue is not
whether the state has given express approval to the playing of a particular
game, but whether Wisconsin's public policy toward class III gaming is
prohibitory or regulatory."' The court discussed the gaming activities that
the state allowed: promotional sweepstakes, bingo, lotteries, and pari-mutuel
betting.' Because the State regulated some activities that involved the
elements of prize, chance and consideration, it did not have a public policy
against class M[ gaming in general." Wisconsin's policy was regulatory, not
prohibitory."
Wisconsin argued that even if its policy toward class III gaming was
regulatory, it should not be required to negotiate games which it did not
72. Id. at 368.
73. Id. at 366.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 367.
76. Id. at 368 (quoting 25 U.S.C.A. § 2710(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1993)).
77. Id.
78. 770 F. Supp. 480 (W.D. Wis. 1991).
79. Id. at 488.
80. Id. at 486.
81. Id.




expressly permit.4 The court disagreed, ruling that express permission was
not the standard. Rather, the question was whether the State allowed the
activity.85 The court used the example of certain class III games operated by
small charitable groups on very limited occasions without state interference.'
By allowing such charitable games, the State foreclosed its claim that it has
a prohibitory policy toward those types of gamesY
The State also argued that its existing regulations should apply to gaming
on Indian land.8" The court flatly rejected this claim, stating that "[i]t was not
Congress's intent that the states would be able to impose their gaming
regulatory schemes on the tribes. The Act's drafters intended to leave it to the
sovereign state and tribal government to negotiate the specific gaming
activities ... under the terms of its tribal-state compact."'
Thus, according to Lac du Flambeau, a state is required to negotiate any
activity that is not expressly prohibited by the state's constitution or statutes.
If a state allows an activity, or simply looks the other way while charitable
organizations conduct certain fundraising events, it could be opening the door
to commercial gambling. Tribes may begin to bolster their arguments with
evidence of every football pool, poker game, charity raffle, and Casino Night
that is not actively prosecuted by the state."
In summary, the question of what games can be included in a tribal-state
class III gaming compact is answered by looking at state law. If a state
prohibits all class Im activities, then it should not negotiate with a tribe for
any class I gaming.
However, if the state allows any form of gambling, then its general policy
toward class III gaming is regulatory, not prohibitory. In such a case, the tribe
may properly request to negotiate any game that is not expressly prohibited
by the state. If a state regulates or restricts a game in some way without
prohibiting it, the tribal-state compact does not have to mirror state law. As
long as the activity is permitted for any purpose by any person anywhere in
the state, the details of regulating conduct on Indian land are open for
negotiation.
84. Id. at 487.
85. Id. at 488.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 487.
89. Id.
90. Linda Epperly, Class III Gaming . . . An Overview of Federal Caselaw and State
Statutes, in SOVEREIGNTY SYMPOSIUM V: THE YEAR OF THE INDIAN 426 (1992) (handbook
prepared by Okla. Supreme Court, Okla. Indian Affairs Comm'n, and Sovereignty Symposium,
Inc. for Sovereignty Symposium V, Oklahoma City, Okla., June 9-11, 1992).
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III. The Oklahoma Experience: Class III Gaming Compact
Between the Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma
and the State of Oklahoma
A. History of Negotiations
Governor David Walters knew that some tribes in Oklahoma wanted to set
up gaming operations on Indian land.9 ' In early June 1991, the governor
appointed Linda Epperly to represent the State of Oklahoma in negotiations
with the tribes.' Ms. Epperly was already employed by the State as an
member of the State Tourism Commission, and state law prohibits employees
from receiving more than one state salary ("dual office holding"). 3 Accord-
ing to Ms. Epperly, Governor Walters apparently believed that the job of
negotiator would take very little time.' Therefore, Ms. Epperly agreed to
accept the appointment without compensation.'
The Potawatomi Tribe decided it wanted to begin gaming activities on
tribal land near Shawnee, Oklahoma. On September 9, 1991, the Tribe sent
a letter to Governor Walters, expressing an interest in entering into negotia-
tions for a tribal-state gaming compact.90
Linda Epperly responded to the Potawatomi's request by scheduling a
preliminary meeting for September 30, 1991.' This meeting was rescheduled
for October 16, at which time Ms. Epperly met with tribal representatives and
Michael Minnis, attorney for the Potawatomis 8 The Tribe communicated its
desire to begin some sort of gaming operations, although specific games were
not discussed at the initial meeting.99 The Tribe also proposed some ideas
regarding what the compact should include, based on similar compacts that
had been proposed in other states.
Ms. Epperly advised the Tribe that she needed input from the Governor
regarding what he would be willing to include in the negotiations.0 She
promised to get back with the Potawatomis by November 6. The deadline
came and went, with no word from Ms. Epperly or the Governor's office. Mr.
91. Telephone Interview with Linda Epperly, former Indian Gaming Negotiator, Office of
Oklahoma Governor David Waiters (Oct. 28, 1992) [hereinafter Epperly Interview).
92. k
93. d.; OKLA. CONST. art. XXIII, § 10; 12 Op. Okla. Att'y Gen. 294 (1980) (opinion no,
80-173).
94. Epperly Interview, supra note 9 1.
95. Id.
96. Interview with Michael Minnis, Attorney for Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of
Oklahoma (Oct. 7, 1992) [hereinafter Minnis Interview].
97. Minnis Interview, supra note 96; Epperly Interview, supra note 91.
98. Minnis Interview, supra note 96; Epperly Interview, supra note 91.
99. Minnis Interview, supra note 96; Epperly Interview, supra note 91.




Minnis made several inquiries, trying to discover the reason for the silence.
The Tribe was anxious to move forward with negotiations.'"' Finally, on
January 16, 1992, the Governor's office sent a letter to Mr. Minnis, advising
him and the Potawatomis that Ms. Epperly had resigned effective January
15.102
When she resigned, Ms. Epperly told the Governor that the job was more
demanding than anyone had expected. By January 1992, twenty-two other
tribes in Oklahoma had expressed an interest in negotiating for gaming
compacts. 3 Ms. Epperly suggested that Governor Walters either hire a full-
time negotiator or appoint someone to be paid an hourly rate.0" In a
February 7 follow-up letter to Mr. Minnis, the Governor promised that a new
negotiator would be named within ten days." 5
On February 14, Governor Walters named Robert A. Nance as the new,
paid negotiator for the State."4 The parties were back at square one, starting
over from scratch. On February 24, Mr. Nance sent a letter to Mr. Minnis and
representatives of the other tribes, announcing that the State was ready to
talk.
On March 2, Mr. Nance met with Mr. Minnis, and the Tribe again
expressed its desire to enter into a gaming compact. Mr. Nance told them that
Governor Walters had not given him any express limitations on the scope of
an agreement. The parties left the meeting agreeing that each would begin
seriously working on making the compact a reality."4
On March 6, Mr. Minnis agreed to draft a generic contract as a starting
point. The contract would generally set forth what the Potawatomis wanted,
without specifying what games would be allowed.'"4 On the same date, Mr.
Nance sent a memorandum to all of the tribes, explaining what activities he
believed were appropriate for gaming compacts with the State of Oklaho-
ma."' The memo outlined the requirements of the IGRA and discussed how
courts have interpreted the statute."' It pointed out that Oklahoma law is
101. Minnis Interview, supra note 96.
102. Id.
103. Telephone Interview with Susan Witt Conyers, General Counsel, Office of Oklahoma
Governor David Walters (Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Conyers Interview]; Letter from Susan Witt
Conyers, General Counsel, Office of Oklahoma Governor David Walters, to author (Mar. 8, 1993)
(on file with author) [hereinafter Conyers Letter].
104. Epperly Interview, supra note 91.
105. Minnis Interview, supra note 96.
106. Id. Mr. Nance is a former Oklahoma Assistant Attorney General. He is currently
employed by the Oklahoma City law firm of Chapel, Riggs, Abney, Neal & Turpen.
107. Minnis Interview, supra note 96.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Memorandum from Robert A. Nance to Oklahoma Tribes Seeking Class III Gaming
Negotiations (Mar. 6, 1992).
111. Id.
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fairly specific in prohibiting most of the activities that the Tribe might want
to conduct as part of its gaming operation."'
Because Oklahoma law strictly prohibited most gambling as a matter of
state policy, such activities could not be included in a gaming compact. The
memo concluded with an invitation for differing legal opinions and authority.
If any of the tribes disagreed with the State's position, Mr. Nance expressed
a willingness to keep an open mind."'
The Potawatomis wanted to negotiate a much broader range of gaming
activities. On March 27, Mr. Minnis sent a memorandum of legal authorities
to support his assertion that the Governor could negotiate the activities that
Mr. Nance believed were not proper. On April 10, Mr. Nance gave his. oral
response to the memo: The only gaming activity proposed by the
Potawatomis that the State would consider was video lottery terminals
(VLTs).'
On April 23, Mr. Nance visited the proposed site. Mr. Minnis made
arrangements to have some VLTs brought to the state for a demonstration to
be held at a later date. On April 29, Mr. Minnis notified the U.S. Attorney
for the Western District of Oklahoma that the demonstrator VLTs would be
brought into the state." 5
On May 1, the U.S. Attorneys for the Northern, Eastern and Western
Districts of the State of Oklahoma told Mr. Nance that they had some
questions about the legality of bringing the VLTs into Oklahoma."6 Their
concern was with the Johnson Act,"7 a federal law which prohibits shipment
of gambling devices into a state which outlaws them."' On May 8, Mr.
Nance and Mr. Minnis agreed that a demonstration would not be neces-
sary."1
9
Although the U.S. Attorneys had expressed concern about the legality of
bringing VLTs into Oklahoma, negotiations with the Potawatomis continued
to move forward." The State and the Potawatomis believed that a compact
between the two sovereigns would take care of any questions of legality. On
May 14, Mr. Minnis sent a revised draft of the earlier proposal, specifying
VLTs as the proposed gaming activity.
On May 28, Mr. Nance met with U.S. Attorneys from each of Oklahoma's
three federal court districts. 2' The U.S. Attorneys' concerns were stated
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Minnis Interview, supra note 96.
115. Hd.; Conyers Letter, supra note 103.
116. Minnis Interview, supra note 96; Conyers Letter, supra note 103.
117. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1171-1178 (1988).
118. Minnis Interview, supra note 96; Conyers Interview, supra note 103.






more forceftilly than they had been previously. They argued that the Johnson
Act would be violated even if there was an agreement between the State and
the Tribe to bring the VLTs within the borders of the state." Mr. Nance
asked for a written opinion or letter that he could send to the tribes." The
U.S. Attorneys refused. 4
On June 3, Mr. Nance met with Mr. Minnis and passed along the gravity
of the U.S. Attorney's verbal warning."z It appeared that the previous
negotiations might be all for naught. The State did not want to enter into an
agreement that violated federal law.' Mr. Minnis proposed that they
continue negotiations, with the Tribe offering to indemnify and hold harmless
the State. 7 Mr. Nance agreed and asked for a clause which specifically
mentioned concerns about the Johnson Act." On June 10, Mr. Minnis hand-
delivered the requested amendments to Mr. Nance."9
On June 12, Mr. Nance proposed a declaratory judgment clause, which
would allow the Tribe to ask the federal court for a ruling on the legality of
importing VLTs into Oklahoma.' Mr. Minnis agreed and prepared another
amendment.'' On June 16, Mr. Nance advised that the Governor had agreed
to the proposed amendments.'2 On June 23, Mr. Minnis and Mr. Nance
each made a few minor changes in wording, without any substantial changes
in meaning.'33
By June 29, Mr. Minnis finished a draft of the compact which incorporated
Johnson Act concerns, provisions for compensation and term of the agree-
ment, and all the other previously discussed factors."M Mr. Minnis hand
delivered the final compact to Mr. Nance for approval by the State.
35
On July 2, a few more minor changes were made, and a revised final draft
was distributed to the parties.' On July 6, 1992, the Business Committee
of the Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma unanimously
approved the compact, and it was signed by the Tribe's Chairman and its
Secretary/Treasurer. 37 On July 10, the compact was signed by Governor
122. Telephone Interview with Robert A. Nance, current Indian Gaming Negotiator for
Oklahoma Governor David Walters (Sept. 16, 1992).
123. Id.
124. Id.
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Walters.' On August 27, it was approved by the state legislature's Joint
Committee on State-Tribal Relations.39 On October 23, 1992, the compact
was approved by the Secretary of the Interior."
B. Contents of the Potawatomi-Oklahoma Gaming Compact
The compact begins with a resolution which sets out the rights and desires
of the parties. 4' This is followed by definitions, findings, and declarations
of policy that closely mirror those in the IGRA."' The parties agreed on a
three-year automatically renewable term.'
The State is given the right to inspect the premises, machines, and records
of the Tribe's gaming operation.TM The Tribe is also required to provide
equipment for the State to remotely monitor all VLTs."45 Various other
specifications for the VLTs are enumerated." The subjects of accounting
and auditing and employment security are detailed.
The Tribe agrees to pay the costs of the compact, including a $5000
payment to reimburse the State for negotiating costs.' The Tribe estab-
lished an escrow account to pay future expenses of the State.4
The compact concedes that the VLTs are gambling devices as defined by
the Johnson Act."5 It acknowledges that all three of the U.S. Attorneys in
Oklahoma believe that importation of VLTs would violate federal law.'
The compact contains a detailed discussion of the Johnson Act problem and
a procedure for testing the legality of the VLTs.
First, the Potawatomis agree to "defend, indemnify and hold harmless
Oklahoma from any liability arising to Oklahoma from the importation of the
as Exhibit A to executed Potawatomi-Oklahoma Gaming Compact, supra note 3).
138. Potawatomi-Oklahoma Gaming Compact, supra note 3, at 12.
139. Id. The Joint Committee on State-Tribal Relations is comprised often state legislators,
and is "responsible for overseeing and approving agreements between tribal governments and the
State of Oklahoma." 74 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 1222 (West Supp. 1992).
140. 57 Fed. Reg. 48, 428 (1992).
141. Potawatomi-Oklahoma Gaming Compact, supra note 3, at iii-iv.
142. Id. at 1-2.
143. Id. at 2-3.
144. Id. at 5.
145. Id
146. Id at 5-6.
147. Id at 7-8.
148. Id. at 8-9. According to Susan Witt Conyers, "The $5,000.00 cost does not begin to
cover the state's cost for the negotiation - the original amount was intended to cover a pro rata
share of costs for the Indian Negotiator." Conyers Letter, supra note 103. It does not include
costs for in-house counsel, the Attorney General's office or the Oklahoma State Bureau of
Investigation. Id.
149. Potawatomi-Oklahoma Gaming Compact, supra note 3, at 8-9.
150. Id. at 9-10.
151. Id. at 10.




VLTs under this compact."'53 The State was reluctant to enter into a
compact for an activity which could be illegal. This clause shifted the burden
for defending the legality of video lottery terminals to the Tribe.
However, post-importation defense is not the only burden the Tribe agreed
to accept. The Potawatomis also agreed to follow a three-step procedure for
assuring the legality of VLTs before beginning gaming operations.'"
The first step is an attempt to obtain written permission. If the
Potawatomis obtain permission from the U.S. Attorney for the Western
District of Oklahoma, they may bring the machines into the state.' 5
If permission cannot be obtained from the U.S. Attorney, the second step
is for the Tribe to seek a declaratory judgment that importation of the
machines does not violate the Johnson Act.'5 Unlike the preceding provi-
sion, the declaratory judgment provision does not specify where the action
must be filed. It merely requires that a "federal court of competent jurisdic-
tion" decide whether importation of VLTs violates the Johnson Act.'" If the
federal court rules in the Tribe's favor, they may begin gaming operations.'58
If the federal court rules against the Tribe, presumably the decision would be
appealed to the Tenth Circuit. If the federal court dismisses the declaratory
judgment action without a decision on the merits, the compact provides a third
step for testing the legality of importing VLTs.
The third step is a test, or direct challenge, to the threat of prosecution.
The Tribe can import up to ten VLTs, simultaneously notifying the appropri-
ate U.S. Attorney in writing of the action.'59 If the U.S. Attorney takes no
action within thirty days, the State agrees to allow the Tribe to import as
many VLTs as it desires, at the Tribe's risk.'"
The compact is accompanied by exhibits which describe the VLTs in
detail, as well as regulations for technical specifications.'
C. Concurrent Negotiations: A State's Duty to Negotiate in Good Faith
When the various tribes were informed that video lottery terminals might
violate the Johnson Act, they did not all react in the same way. As seen
above, the Potawatomi Tribe dealt with the problem head-on by acknowledg-
153. Id. at 10.
154. Id. at 10-11.
155. Id. at 10.
156. Id.
157. Id. The Potawatomis proposed gaming site is located within the Western District of
Oklahoma. The other two federal court districts in Oklahoma have been interested and
opinionated in the Potawatomi negotiations but would not have jurisdiction to decide the
Potawatomi-Oklahoma compact's declaratory judgment question.
158. Potawatomi-Okahoma Gaming Compact, supra note 3, at 10.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at Exhibits B, C.
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ing it in the compact. The State and the Tribe devised a method to test the
legality of the machines.
The Ponca Tribe of Oklahoma was also involved in negotiations for a
gaming compact with the State of Oklahoma. The Poncas interpreted the
announcement of the Johnson Act problem as a change in the State's
willingness to negotiate. On May 28, 1992, the Ponca Tribe broke off
negotiations with the State. On June 6, the Tribe filed suit against the State
in U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. The Poncas
alleged that the State had "failed to give good faith consideration to the
Tribe's request for inclusion of various forms of machine gaming and casino
gaming in the Compact negotiations."'"
The suit did not make it to court-ordered mediation, nor were the merits
of the Poncas' bad faith claim ever heard. On September 8, 1992, Chief Judge
Ralph Thompson held in Ponca Tribe v. Oklahoma"s that it was unconstitu-
tional for Congress to require a state, against its will, to enter into an
agreement with a tribe regarding gambling activities on tribal land within the
state. Because the goal of the Ponca Tribe's suit was to try to force
Oklahoma into an agreement, Judge Thompson dismissed it.
The decision was founded upon the Tenth Amendment and Eleventh
Amendment. The Tenth Amendment reserves powers to the states that are not
specifically enumerated in the Constitution." The court recognized that
Congress can encourage the states to adopt legislation that conforms to federal
interests." However, it drew a distinction at federal attempts to force state
regulation.'67 The possibility exists that a state could be compelled to enter
a compact against the state's wishes. Thus, a state would be forced into
regulating gaming within its borders."~ "A critical alternative is missing in
the IGRA - a State may not simply decline to regulate Class m1 gaming; it
does not have the option of refusing to act."'" Therefore, the court said that
the IGRA creates an unconstitutional interference with the state's sovereign
contracting powers under the Tenth Amendment. 7
The Eleventh Amendment prohibits suits in federal court "by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or subjects of any foreign state," in which a state
162. Complaint at 7, Ponca Tribe v. Oklahoma, No. CIV 92-988T (W.D. Okla. filed June
6, 1992).
163. No. CIV 92-988T (W.D. Okla. Sept. 8, 1992).
164. Id., slip op. at 5, 11.
165. U.S. CONsT. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.").
166. Ponca, No. CIV 92-988T, slip op. at 10.
167. ld., slip op. at 11.
168. Id.
169. Id.




is defendant.' The Constitution does not expressly prohibit a suit by an
Indian tribe against a state, although there is some precedent for such an
expanded interpretation of a state's sovereign immunity."
In the Ponca decision, Judge Thompson recognized that a state may waive
its Eleventh Amendment immunity, or Congress may enact legislation which
alters the immunity.' However, the court said there was no indication that
Oklahoma ever intended to waive its immunity.74 Also, the court said that
Congress did not clearly intend for the IGRA's federal jurisdiction clause to
do away with the state's sovereign immunity.75 "A general authorization for
suit in federal court is not the kind of unequivocal statutory language
sufficient to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment."'76
The IGRA gave tribes a statutory sword that could be used to push states
to the negotiating table. The district court's decision in Ponca takes that sword
away and shifts the balance of power to the state. The ruling has sent ripples
of uncertainty into the legal community." The Ponca Tribe has appealed
the decision,' and the case is currently pending before the Tenth Cir-
cuit.'79
IV. Problems with Tribal-State Gaming Compacts
The Oklahoma experience illustrates two serious problems with the IGRA.
First, if the Johnson Act prohibits importation of machines that are the subject
of the gaming compact, the Potawatomi agreement is worthless. The State
represented that video lottery terminals would be acceptable, and the Tribe
negotiated with the intent of setting up a VLT gaming operation. If the
Johnson Act is applicable, the equipment cannot be imported, possessed, or
used in Indian country. 180
Second, if the Ponca decision is affirmed on appeal, the negotiating power
of the tribes will be far less than Congress intended. Tribes who want to
conduct gaming activities will be limited to negotiating for what the state
wants to allow. In effect, states will be able to impose their laws and
regulations in Indian country. Each of these problems is discussed below.
171. U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.").
172. See, e.g., Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 1I1 S. Ct. 2578 (1991).
173. Ponca, No. CIV 92-988T, slip op. at 4.
174. Id., slip op. at 5.
175. Id., slip op. at 5-6.
176. Id., slip op. at 6 (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,246 (1985)).
177. See, e.g., Oklahoma Precedent May Help New Mexico, OKLA. DAILY (Univ. of Okla.,
Norman, Okla.), Sept. 17, 1992, at 12.
178. Notice of appeal filed Oct. 6, 1992.
179. 10th Cir. No. 92-6331.
180. 15 U.S.C. § 1175 (1988).
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A. Effect of Johnson Act on Gaming Activities
The Johnson Act defines a gambling device as a "machine or mechanical
device ... designed and manufactured primarily for use in connection with
gambling, and... by the operation of which a person may become entitled
to receive, as the result of the application of an element of chance, any money
or property."'8' The State of Oklahoma and the Potawatomi Tribe agree that
video lottery terminals are gambling devices."
The Johnson Act goes on to prohibit interstate transportation of a gambling
device to a state which prohibits the device.'83 The statute implicitly
presumes that states prohibit gambling devices."' However, an exception
exists if a state has enacted a law allowing the particular device or allowing
gambling in a certain area of the state." If a gambling device is being
transported to a facility "where betting is legal under applicable State laws,"
such transportation is not prohibited by the Johnson Act." Section 1175 of
the Johnson Act prohibits gambling devices within Indian country,'87 but the
IGRA encourages class II gaming as a means of promoting tribal self-
sufficiency."
As pointed out above, the Potawatomi-Oklahoma Gaming Compact
provided alternatives for dealing with the Johnson Act. The U.S. Attorney for
the Western District of Oklahoma would not issue a letter approving the use
of video lottery terminals, so the Tribe filed a declaratory judgment action. 9
The court ruled against the Tribe, holding that the IGRA could not waive the
Johnson Act, because video lottery terminals are not legal in Oklahoma."
The Tenth Circuit affirmed. 9'
The courts accepted the U.S. Attorney's assertion that a tribal-state gaming
compact does not make betting legal under applicable state laws. Specifically,
the U.S. Attorney for the Western District argued that if
Congress had intended to permit (as against Johnson Act con-
cerns) anything that a state or state governor was willing to sign
a compact for, it could have easily provided for that result by
181. 15 U.S.C. § 1171(a)(2) (1988).
182. Potawatomi-Oklahoma Gaming Compact, supra note 3, at 9.




187. 15 U.S.C. § 1175 (1988).
188. 25 U.S.C. § 2702 (1988).
189. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe v. Heaton, No. CIV-92-2095-W (W.D. Okla.
filed Oct. 23, 1992).
190. Order of Feb. 2, 1993, Heaton (No. CIV-92-2095-W).
191. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe v. Green, 995 F.2d 179 (10th Cir. 1993). John
E. Green was substituted as defendant in place of Joe Heaton after Green took over the office of




having § 2710(d)(6)'s language read as follows: The provisions
of section 1175 shall not apply to any gaming conducted under a
Tribal-State compact. [Instead, the IGRA makes the Johnson Act
inapplicable] to gaming conducted under a compact with a state
"in which gambling devices are legal ... ""
If a state enters into a compact, do the gambling devices agreed to in the
compact become legal in the state? Is a tribal-state gaming compact a law?
"Law, in its generic sense, is a body of rules of action or conduct prescribed
by controlling authority, and having binding legal force."'93 Under this
definition, the Potawatomi-Oklahoma gaming compact would certainly qualify
as a law. It was negotiated by Oklahoma's Governor, was approved as
provided by Oklahoma's State-Tribal Relations Act, and presumably was
intended to have binding legal force to regulate gaming within the state's
boundaries.
Did Congress intend tribal-state compacts signed pursuant to the IGRA to
waive the Johnson Act's prohibition against use or possession of gambling
devices in Indian country? Sen. Daniel Inouye (D-Haw.), one of the IGRA's
sponsors, clarified the apparent conflict between the purposes of the IGRA
and the Johnson Act: "The bill as reported by the committee would not alter
the effect of the Johnson Act except to provide for a waiver of its application
in the case of gambling devices operated pursuant to a compact with the State
in which the tribe is located.""4
Tribal-state compacts are a relatively new creation, and the courts have not
yet had a chance to define them in any detail. The most analogous creature
is the interstate compact. The Constitution limits the rights of states to enter
into agreements with other governments.'95 Congress must consent to such
agreements.'
Courts have consistently held that interstate. compacts that have been
approved by Congress have the force of law."9 The U.S. Supreme Court has
stated that "unless the compact to which Congress has consented is somehow
192. Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant's Cross
Motion for Summary Judgment, and Brief in Support at 15, Heaton (No. CIV-92-2095-W).
193. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 884 (6th ed. 1990) (citing United States Fidelity & Guar.
Co. v. Guenther, 281 U.S. 34 (1930)).
194. 134 CONG. REC. 12650, Sept. 15, 1988, quoted in 57 Fed. Reg. 12382-01 cmt. (1988).
195. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 ("No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay
any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement
or Compact with another State, or with a foreign power, or engage in War, unless actually
invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.").
196. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
197. See, e.g., Oklahoma & Texas v. New Mexico, 111 S. Ct. 2281, reh'g denied, 112 S. Ct.
27 (1991) ("[W]here the terms of the compact are unambiguous, this Court must give effect to
the express mandate of the signatory States."); Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554 (1983)
(holding that congressional consent transforms interstate compact into law).
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The Constitution's Compact Clause was intended to prevent the states from
binding with other governments in agreements which undermine the
supremacy of the federal government."9 If an interstate compact does not
interfere with the supremacy of the United States, congressional approval may
not be required.' A tribal-state gaming compact does not interfere with the
supremacy of the federal government. Rather, it promotes federal goals.
The Supreme Court has also said that Congress may consent to an
interstate compact by authorizing joint state action in advance." In the
IGRA, Congress not only authorizes joint action between states and tribes -
Congress encourages such joint action.2" Congress clearly consents to
tribal-state compacts in advance.
If interstate compacts have the force of law, then tribal-state compacts
should as well. Tribal-state gaming compacts are not intended to undermine
the supremacy of the U.S. government. They have been expressly authorized
and endorsed by Congress as a means of promoting tribal sovereignty and
self-sufficiency. Congress gave clear consent to gaming compacts and
delegated specific approval duties to the Secretary of the Interior.
If courts choose to follow the precedents set by interstate compacts and the
intent of Congress in the IGRA, tribal-state gaming compacts will be given
the force of law. If courts seek rationale for some other conclusion, they will
clearly be legislating from the bench.
The Potawatomi-Oklahoma gaming compact creates rights and responsibili-
ties on each of the parties. It was authorized by Congress and approved by
the Secretary of the Interior. The State of Oklahoma has agreed that the
Potawatomi video lottery operation will be a place where betting is legal
under applicable state laws. The tribal-state compact creates an exception to
the Johnson Act, and the tribe should be allowed to import the VLTs without
fear of criminal prosecution.
B. Effect of Ponca Tribe v. Oklahoma on Future Negotiations
As discussed above, the IGRA has a bias in favor of allowing tribes to
operate gaming ventures. If a tribe is unable to reach an agreement with the
state, the IGRA allows the court and/or the Secretary of the Interior to, in
effect, decide what games the state will allow on Indian land within its
borders. The state has a strong incentive to work with the tribe, in order to
198. Oklahoma & Texas v. New Mexico, 111 S. Ct. at 2294 (quoting Texas v. New Mexico,
462 U.S. 554, 564 (1983)).
199. Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433 (1981).
200. d.
201. Id.




make sure the final agreement reflects state interests. The state does not hold
any similar bargaining chips or threats that it can wield as effectively against
the tribe. The IGRA sets out a procedure which should result in a gaming
compact that is favorable to the tribe.
The decision in Ponca turns the negotiating power upside down. A state
can simply say "no" and walk away from the table without fear of having
something forced upon it. This is clearly against the express intent of
Congress. Congress intended the IGRA to promote tribal gaming. 3 The Act
was not directed toward protecting state interests. In fact, the Senate Select
Committee on Indian Affairs said, "It is the Committee's intent that the
compact requirement for class Im not be used as a justification by a State for
excluding Indian tribes from such gaming or for the protection of other State-
licensed gaming enterprises from free market competition with Indian
tribes."
The Tenth Amendment rationale for the Ponca decision relies on New York
v. United States,.°5 in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that Congress
cannot "cross[] the line distinguishing encouragement from coercion."' The
Ponca decision said that a "critical alternative is missing in the IGRA - a
State may not simply decline to regulate Class I gaming; it does not have
the option of refusing to act."'2 7
The federal government has an interest in promoting tribal government and
self-sufficiency and can pass statutes to enable tribes to achieve these goals.
The Indian Commerce Clause" allows Congress to regulate commerce with
Indian Tribes. Whether Oklahoma likes it or not, the federal government can
intervene in the relationship between states and tribes. The Constitution
specifically delegates such power to the United States.'
The Tenth Amendment rationale implies that states should be allowed to
hold tribes hostage, by simply refusing to negotiate an IGRA-mandated
compact or by limiting the scope of negotiations. In effect, Oklahoma would
be imposing its statutes and regulations on tribal lands. This would contradict
the well-established rule that "tribal sovereignty is dependent on, and
203. Id.
204. S. REP. No. 446, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3071, 3083.
205. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
206. Id. at 2428.
207. Ponca Tribe v. Oklahoma, No. CIV 92-988T, slip op. at 11 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 8, 1992).
208. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
209. Id.
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subordinate to, only the Federal Government, not the States. ''210 The Tenth
Amendment does not reserve to the states the right to govern Indian country.
The Eleventh Amendment foundation for the decision is also shaky. The
court said that Oklahoma did not waive its sovereign immunity, which is true.
However, the court also claimed that Congress may not have the power under
the Indian Commerce Clause to abrogate state immunity. The court acknowl-
edged that the Interstate Commerce Clause could be the source for congressio-
nal action to abrogate state immunity but refused to recognize the same power
in the Indian Commerce Clause.
There may be some differences between the congressional power granted
by Indian Commerce Clause and the Interstate Commerce Clause. Judge
Thompson sees the former as weak and the latter as a powerful source of
congressional authority. Others see the situation differently.
Felix Cohen wrote, "The commerce clause is the only grant of power in the
Federal Constitution which mentions Indians. The congressional power over
commerce with the Indian tribes plus the treaty-making power is much
broader than the power over commerce between states.
23
Justice John Marshall wrote, "As to trade with the Indian tribes, . . . it
must stand on the same footing as foreign commerce and that among the
states, as they are all given in the same sentence."2 2 The Supreme Court has
also said that "Congress... has the exclusive and absolute power to regulate
commerce with the Indian tribes, - a power as broad and as free from




The Tenth Circuit should reject the Ponca decision as an incorrect
understanding of congressional power. The Constitution gives Congress
authority to pass legislation which steers state-tribal relations toward federal
and tribal goals. In passing the IGRA, Congress was explicitly shifting the
balance of power toward Indians in gaming negotiations with the states. The
clear meaning of the IGRA and the intent of Congress should be followed in
overturning the district court's decision in Ponca Tribe v. Oklahoma.
C. Summary of Suggestions
The IGRA expanded states' control over Indian tribes by allowing states to
negotiate with tribes regarding gaming activities. What had once been a
questionable area of tribal sovereignty has been clarified. Indians do not have
210. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207 (1987) (quoting
Washingtcn v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 154 (1980));
see also United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) (holding that Indian tribes retain
sovereignty over their members and their land).
211. FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 91 (Five Rings 1986) (reprint
of Univ. of N.M. photo. reprint 1971) (1942).
212. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 120-21 (1824).




exclusive control over Indian land. In effect, the states have been given a very
loud voice on the council of any tribe that wants to conduct gaming activities.
The increased state influence over Indian country has been balanced by
giving tribes the power to force good faith negotiations. The IGRA encourag-
es gaming operations on Indian land by pushing the parties toward the
negotiating table. If the state refuses to negotiate in good faith, a tribe can
exercise its sovereign powers through the "cram down" provision of the
IGRA.1 4
In Oklahoma, the process that led to the Potawatomi gaming compact has
been an eye-opener. It illustrates how the compact negotiation process can
work and shows how it can break down. It also sets the stage for what games
will be negotiable in the future.
Meanwhile, the Ponca Tribe's appeal to the Tenth Circuit will help
determine how much power the respective parties will have in future
negotiations. If the court affirms state sovereignty over Congress' purpose in
passing the IGRA, the power of tribes to negotiate meaningful compacts will
be gutted. States will be able to impose state rules on Indian land with little
fear of repercussions.
The Tenth Circuit should recognize the shallowness of the State's Tenth
Amendment and Eleventh Amendment claims. The Court should follow the
well-established rule that Indians have sovereignty over their own land. The
court should force the State back to the negotiating table to conclude an
agreement which reflects state, tribal, and federal interests.
V. Conclusion
The Potawatomi-Oklahoma gaming compact illustrates legal issues that will
have far-reaching effects in the field of Indian law. The applicability of the
Johnson Act to devices destined for a legal Indian gaming facility is a
roadblock that gaming opponents can use to strengthen state regulation of
Indian country. Undoubtedly, the question is destined for the Supreme Court.
The Court will also be faced with whether states may use the Tenth
Amendment and Eleventh Amendment as justification for walking away from
negotiations with tribes who wish to enter into gaming compacts. Until the
high court gives some firm, unambiguous guidance, tribal gaming is unlikely
to become a reality in Oklahoma.
214. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii) (1988).
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